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Abstract
Social media has played an important role in shaping political
discourse over the last decade. At the same time, it is often
perceived to have increased political polarization, thanks to
the scale of discussions and their public nature.
In this paper, we try to answer the question of whether po-
litical polarization in the US on Twitter has increased over
the last eight years. We analyze a large longitudinal Twitter
dataset of 679,000 users and look at signs of polarization in
their (i) network - how people follow political and media ac-
counts, (ii) tweeting behavior - whether they retweet content
from both sides, and (iii) content - how partisan the hashtags
they use are. Our analysis shows that online polarization has
indeed increased over the past eight years and that, depending
on the measure, the relative change is 10%-20%. Our study
is one of very few with such a long-term perspective, encom-
passing two US presidential elections and two mid-term elec-
tions, providing a rare longitudinal analysis.
Introduction
Social media has had a tremendous impact on society by re-
defining ways in which we get exposed to information. A
recent Pew survey found that more than 60% of Americans
get their news from social media [7]. While there have been
a lot of benefits that social media has brought about, includ-
ing access to a wealth of knowledge, connections and infor-
mation, social media is also hypothesized to encourage the
creation of echo chambers, where users reinforce their own
viewpoints and discredit the view points they do not agree
with.1 This can potentially lead to a downward spiral of ever
increasing political polarization2, which, in turn, makes it
harder to have a fact-based debate and to reach a consensus
on controversial issues.
Though a lot of studies have shown the existence of po-
larization on social media [4, 1], little analysis has been
done on long term trends. Performing a study across sev-
eral decades, as has been done to demonstrate the increasing
polarization in the US House of Representatives [2], is of
∗This is a pre-print of a short paper accepted at ICWSM’17.
Please cite that version instead.
1https://goo.gl/SWk1SR
2The term polarization always refers to political polarization in
this paper.
course impossible as social media is still a fairly recent phe-
nomenon. However, since Twitter was founded in 2006 and
its usage now spans several US presidential elections, we
still have potential data for a decade.
The main question we want to answer in this paper is if
political polarization has increased over time on social me-
dia. To address this question, we collect data from Twitter
related to both social network structure and tweet content
for a large set of users (679,000) engaging with US politics.
We define polarization as a tendency to be restricted in
terms of obtaining or engaging with political information
to one side of the left-vs.-right political spectrum. To avoid
drawing conclusions based on a single perspective, we ad-
dress three questions each using a different type of infor-
mation. Namely, (i) have users become less likely to follow
both sides of the political spectrum, (ii) have users become
less likely to retweet both sides, and (iii) have users become
less likely to use hashtags shared by both sides.
Our analysis reveals that, according to all three measures,
polarization has increased by 10% and 20% between 2009
and 2016.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study ana-
lyzing political polarization on Twitter over a period of eight
years. As it is always easy to get caught up in the heat of the
moment, we believe that our study adds a valuable long-term
perspective to the evolution of online polarization in the US.
Related Work
Potentially the first study to describe political polarization
in a data-driven manner was work by Adamic et al.[1] who
point out a clustered structure of hyperlinks between ideo-
logically opposing blogs. Similar analysis on Twitter [4] re-
vealed that political polarization exists on Twitter and man-
ifests itself in a way that users endorse (retweet) their own
side, but not the opposing side. On a similar note, [6] show
that most polarized discussions on social media have a well-
defined structure, when looking at the retweet network.
From a content perspective, [11] consider discussion of
controversial and non-controversial news over a span of
seven months and identify a correlation between controver-
sial issues and the use of biased and emotional language.
They measure bias using manually curated sets of keywords
and emotional language using lexicon dictionaries, like Sen-
tiWordNet.
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Weber et al. [16] study temporal changes in political po-
larization in Egypt and present evidence that increases in
their hashtag-based measure of polarization precede events
of violence in the real world. In a similar spirit, Morales
et al. [12] study polarization over a period of two months
during the death of Hugo Chavez and identify an increase
in polarization in conjunction with external events. Yardi et
al. [17] study the evolution of a gun violence incident on
Twitter for two months and show how homophily plays a
role in polarizing discussions. Du et al. [5] compare two sep-
arate snapshots of a random sample of the Twitter follower
network, one taken in June 2016 and one in August 2016.
They then observe that, in line with theories on “triadic clo-
sure”, ‘new edges are (at least 3-4 times) more likely to be
created inside existing communities than between communi-
ties and existing edges are more likely to be removed if they
are between communities’. Such mechanisms could lead to
the increase in polarization that we observe in our study.
Perhaps the closest to this work is the study by Andris et
al. [2] who study the partisanship of the US congress over
a long period of time. They find that partisanship in the US
congress has been increasing for the past few decades.
Concerning longitudinal studies of social media, Liu et
al. [9] analyze seven years of Twitter data to quantify how
the users, their behavior, and the site as a whole have
evolved. Their work, however, does not describe aspects par-
ticular to political polarization.
Dataset
Our dataset is collected around a set of public seed Twitter
accounts: politicians and media outlets, with known politi-
cal leaning. From these seed users we then crawl outwards
by collecting data for users who follow or retweet the seed
users. Details as follows.
Seed Accounts
Our point of departure is a list with two types of polarized
seed accounts. The first type consists of presidential/vice
presidential candidates and their parties (see the political ac-
counts in Table 1) for the last eight years. The second type
consists of popular media accounts listed in Table 1. The list
of media outlets was obtained from a report by the Pew Re-
search Center on polarization and media habits.3
Following Users
For each seed user, we obtained all their followers. The com-
bined set of all followers for all seed accounts gave us a
total of 140M users. We estimated the time when a user fol-
lowed a particular seed account using the method proposed
by Meeder et al.[10]. This method is based on the fact that
the Twitter API returns followers in the reverse chronologi-
cal order in which they followed and we can lower bound the
follow time using the account creation date of a user. So, as
at least some of @BarackObama’s followers started to fol-
low him right after creating their Twitter account, this leads
to temporal bounds for the other followers as well. These
3http://www.journalism.org/2014/10/21/
political-polarisation-media-habits/
estimates are reported to be fairly accurate when estimating
follow times for users with millions of followers. For our
analysis, we used all cases with estimated follow dates from
January 2009 onwards.
Retweeting Users
For the set of seed politicians, we obtained all their public,
historic tweets4. The earliest tweets in this collection date
back to 2006. For each collected tweet, we used the Twitter
API to collect up to 100 retweets. This gave us a set of 1.3M
unique users who retweeted a political entity since 2006.
We randomly sampled 50% of these users (679,000), and
used the Twitter API to get 3,200 of their most recent tweets
in December 2016. This gave us around 2 billion tweets.
Though we have tweets dating back to 2007, we only con-
sider tweets from September 2009 onwards in the analysis
since the volume for earlier tweets is low. We perform all
our subsequent analysis for retweets and hashtag polariza-
tion computation on this data.
Table 1: US seed accounts with known political leaning.
Top: political candidates and parties. Bottom: partisan
media outlets.
Political accounts Side
barackobama,joebiden,timkaine,hillaryclinton,
thedemocrats left
realdonaldtrump,mike pence,mittromney,gop,
speakerryan,senjohnmccain,sarahpalinusa right
Media outlets Side
npr,pbs,abc,cbsnews,nbcnews,cnn,usatoday,
nytimes,washingtonpost,msnbc,guardian,
newyorker,politico,motherjones,slate,
huffingtonpost,thinkprogress,dailykos,edshow left
theblaze,foxnews,breitbartnews,drudge report,
seanhannity,glennbeck,rushlimbaugh right
Experiments
In our quest to understand long-term polarization trends, we
look at three aspects: (i) If user are now more likely to follow
users across the political spectrum, (ii) if they are now more
likely to retweet such users, and (iii) if users are now more
likely to use hashtags which are used by both sides. Here
we describe the three types of experiments we performed,
related to following and retweeting behavior in the first part,
followed by experiments related to hashtags usage.
Following and Retweeting Behavior
To observe changes in the polarization of the following
(retweeting) behavior, we wanted to track changes in the
probability to follow (retweet) accounts from both sides. As,
due to sparsity, following (retweeting) only a single user
from one of the two sides is not necessarily a strong signal
4Since the Twitter API restricts us to the last 3200 tweets, we
used a public tool to get all historic tweets https://github.
com/Jefferson-Henrique/GetOldTweets-python
for polarization, we decided to apply a Bayesian methodol-
ogy. Before observing any evidence, we gave each follow-
ing (retweeting) user a uniform prior probability to follow
(retweet) seed users from either side. Concretely, we used a
beta distribution with a uniform prior (α = β = 1), where α
measures the left leaning and β the right leaning.
Then every follow (retweet) to either side increases the
count for that side by +1, basically simulating a repeated
coin toss where we are studying the bias of the coin. As the
beta distribution is the conjugate prior of the binomial dis-
tribution, we might obtain something like α = 4, β = 2 for
a (mostly) left leaning user. The mean of the beta distribu-
tion, and hence the “leaning” l of the following (retweeting)
user, is defined as l = α/(α + β), taking the leftness as
the direction of the index. We defined the polarization p as
p = 2 · |0.5− l|, giving a measure between 0.0 and 1.0 mea-
suring the deviation from a balanced leaning.
For each political follower/retweeter and each year, this
method gives us a value of polarization. Figure 1 plots the
distribution of the average polarization and shows temporal
shifts. Note that whereas we have the following information
for both political and media seed accounts, we only have the
retweeting users for political seed. Regardless of whether us-
ing politician or media outlet seed accounts, and regardless
of whether using following or retweeting information, polar-
ization has increased from 2009 to 2016 between 10-20% in
relative terms.
Hashtag Polarization
The third type of polarization we analyze relates to content
polarization, more specifically to the polarization of hash-
tags used by users. Conceptually, a society could be thought
of as polarized if there are two opposing sides who speak dif-
ferent languages, in that they differ completely in the words
they choose to describe things. For example, one person’s
“global warming” could be another person’s “climategate”.
We operationalize this idea by applying the methodology
previously used in [15].
In their methodology, for a given week, a user is assigned
a leaning based on the political seed accounts they retweet
during that week. Users not retweeting seed accounts dur-
ing the week do not contribute. Each hashtag h is then as-
signed a leaning lh between 0.0=right and 1.0=left based on
the leaning of the users using the hashtags in the given week.
Differences in user volumes for the two sides are corrected
for and smoothing is applied to deal with sparsity. For each
hashtag h in a given week, its polarization ph is then, as be-
fore, defined as ph = 2 · |0.5− l|. The values of ph are then
averaged across all h used in a given week by retweeting
users. See [15] for details.
To further reduce noise due to low volumes, in particu-
lar during the early years, we (i) ignored hashtags used by
fewer than five users, and (ii) computed moving averages
across five weeks. To look for drifts in the time series, we
first tested for stationarity of the time series. An augmented
Dickey-Fuller test found the time series to be non-stationary
(p < 0.0001). Next, we computed the linear fit across time
and tested the value of the non-zero slope for statistical sig-
nificance using a t-test (p < 0.0001).
Figure 2 shows the temporal changes for the measure of
hashtag polarization together with the linear fit superim-
posed. Similar to the following and retweeting polarization,
there is a relative increase of about 20% between 2009 and
2016. Due to the finer time scale, Figure 2 also suggests that
the time around elections corresponds to local maxima in
polarization, whereas the time after elections corresponds
to local minima. For the 2010 midterm elections, however,
this observation does not hold, potentially due to noisier es-
timates based on fewer active users on Twitter.
Conclusions
There is conflicting evidence on whether social media (i)
actively increases offline polarization through the formation
of online echo chambers, (ii) merely reflects offline polar-
ization [14], or (iii) helps to reduce offline polarization by
exposing users to a more diverse set of opinions than they
would find in their offline social network [3].
Though our analysis does not directly settle this debate,
it provides evidence that polarization on Twitter has in-
creased over the past eight years, potentially reflecting in-
creases in offline polarization as those observed in the US
House of Representatives [2]. Furthermore, for three differ-
ent methodologies, the relative size of the increase of polar-
ization was found to be between 10% and 20%.
In our work, we did not explicitly attempt to detect “astro-
turfing” and other types of automated tweets [13]. However,
due to the longitudinal nature of our study, by the time of
the data collection (2016/2017) Twitter will have had time
to catch most cases of users violating their terms of ser-
vice, suspending their accounts. More organic efforts such as
hashtag hijacking [8] could still affect our analysis, though
these effects are arguably also part of the political landscape
and should be included.
Given the running up to the 2016 US presidential elec-
tions and concerns of a President Trump - famous for his
Twitter politics - doing little to attempt to reduce polariza-
tion, we speculate that the online polarization will continue
to increase in the foreseeable future.
Finally, as social media is coming of age and soon
teenagers will no longer remember a pre-social-media era,
new opportunities for longitudinal studies arise. At the same
time, technical challenges related to “most recent activity
only” API limitations hinder such studies. Still, we expect
and look forward to more long-term analysis such as ours in
the future.
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Figure 1: Follow (a,b) and retweet (c) effects over time for politicians (a,c) and media (b) seed accounts.
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